Congressional Research Service Report for Congress

 Forest Fires and Forest Health

Ross W. Gorte

Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division

Updated July 14, 1995

 95-511 ENR

 

SUMMARY

Interest in fuel management, to reduce fire control costsand damages, has been renewed with the numerous, destructivewildfires spread across the West during the summer of 1994. Fuelmanagement is often linked to forest health, since major foresthealth concerns include excess biomass (i.e., fuel loadings) andcatastrophic fires. Several tools, such as prescribed burning andsalvage timber sales, can address these problems, but the extent ofthe problem and the cost of needed treatments are generally unknown.Fuel management may well reduce fire control costs and damages, butthe evidence is largely anecdotal, with few documented estimates ofthe decline in control costs and/or damages associated with fueltreatments. Finally, the roles and responsibilities of the Federaland State governments in fire protection may be subject to furtherdebate.

 INTRODUCTION

 The 1994 fire season saw numerous large wildfires, with thedeaths of several firefighters and the destruction of manystructures. Many observers suggested that the extent and severity ofthe fires was largely due to the poor health of the national forestsof the West.(1) These observers argue that activities to improveforest health by reducing fuel loadings will also reduce fire controlcosts and fire damages. This report describes fuel management and itsbenefits for controlling wildfires and for reducing fire damages, anddiscusses the relative roles and responsibilities of the Federal andState governments in wildfire protection.(2)

 FUEL MANAGEMENT

 The Forest Service began moving into fuel management in the1960s, to reduce the net cost of wildfires to society. Althoughnumerous techniques can be used, one of the most common is prescribedburning -- intentionally setting fires within established controlboundaries under prescribed conditions to burn the existing fuelswhen and where the fire can be contained. Occasionally, weatherconditions change, and prescribed fires escape, causing unanticipateddamages; for example, the Mack Lake fire in Michigan in May 1980 wasa prescribed fire that escaped and killed one person and destroyed 44homes and buildings.(3) Despite the obvious risks, however,prescribed burning can be an efficient tool for reducingsmall-diameter fuels at or near ground level.

 Salvage timber operations can also be used to reduce fuelloadings. The Timber Salvage Sale Fund is a self-financing,permanently appropriated special account, with receipts fromdesignated salvage sales deposited into the account for use inpreparing and administering future salvage sales (and for roadconstruction associated with those salvage sales).(4) To the extentthat salvage sales remove woody materials from the forest, they canbe considered fuel management activities. Furthermore, they can belegitimate tools for achieving desired forest health conditions.(5)However, because they have to be sold, salvage sales must focus atleast partially on removing merchantable wood, and reducing fuelloadings or achieving desired forest conditions could be compromised.At a minimum, salvage sales are insufficient to fulfill the lattergoals. In addition, salvage sales can be costly to the U.S. Treasury;they often cost more than the revenues they can generate, becausetimber quality is lower and operating costs for the buyers arehigher.

 Other tools for reducing fuel loadings also exist. Pruning,precommercial thinning, and mechanical or chemical release can reducelive biomass and make it more susceptible to elimination, naturally(through decomposition or wildfire) or in prescribed fires. However,these tools are less commonly used because of their relatively highcosts.

 Finally, the possible extent of fuel management and foresthealth activities is largely undefined. To date, the discussions ofprescribed burning, salvage sales, and other fuel management orforest health activities have identified neither the acreage needingtreatment nor the likely treatment costs. Treatment costs probablyrange from less than $100 to more than $1,000 per acre; "average"costs may be about $250 per acre. If 10 percent of the NationalForest System lands in the coterminous western States -- about 14million acres -- were treated, total treatment costs would be $3.5billion, roughly equal to the annual Forest Service budget. However,these "guesstimates" are very coarse; needed treatments might costless than $1 billion or more than $10 billion, and could be spreadover a decade or more.

 FIRE CONTROL

 In general, when wildfires occur, the fire organizationswings into full gear to try to stop them. For several years,beginning in the late 1970s, the Forest Service and the National ParkService had "prescribed natural fire'' policies. In wilderness areasand Park System units with fire management plans, wildfires burningwithin prescribed situations were monitored, rather than aggressivelysuppressed. (These policies have been colloquially known as"let-burn" policies.) In recognition of the financial andenvironmental costs of total fire suppression, these policiespermitted the use of wildfires to achieve the goals of prescribedfires. Following the Yellowstone fires in 1988, however, the use ofprescribed natural fire was halted. While one can question whetherthe prescriptions were sufficiently responsive to burning conditions(fuel moisture, precipitation, dry lightning, winds, etc.), thetermination of prescribed natural fire policies may have been anoverreaction to the public sentiment.

 The public outcry over the fires in Yellowstone and duringthe summer of 1994 is, in part, a result of the belief that allwildfires can be controlled. This belief is widespread, internally aswell as among the public, because of our general success incontrolling structural fires in urban and suburban areas and becauseall wildfires eventually go out. However, most fire experts agreethat, because of fuel types and loadings, topography, and temporaryweather conditions (lasting a few hours to several weeks), some firessimply cannot be stopped and some cannot even be influenced.Substantial funds are spent on efforts to suppress what areuncontrollable wildfires. Such efforts contribute to the belief inour ability to stop all wildfires, and lead the public to believethat damages from wildfires only occur because of the Government hasbeen inefficient and ineffective .

 The desire to control all wildfires has also led to a beliefthat fast, aggressive control efforts are efficient, because firesthat are stopped while small will not become the large, damaging,fearsome fires that are so expensive to control. The belief inefficiency of fast, aggressive fire control was embodied in the10-acre and 10:00 a.m. policies of the 1930s.(6) However, only afraction of fire ignitions ever become catastrophic fires, evenwithout fire suppression. These 10-acre and 10:00 a.m. policies wereterminated in the late 1970s, because research documented that thepolicies led to organization size and efforts that far outweighed thebenefits of fire control.

 The preferred technique to evaluate the economics of firecontrol, and of fuel management, is known as"least-cost-plus-loss."(7) This approach, in essence, asserts thatfire control is only justified by the damage prevented. Little or nofire control is economically justified for wildfires that are doinglittle or no damage (the underlying idea for the prescribed naturalfire policies) or for wildfires that cannot be controlled (because nodamage can be prevented). Similarly, fuel management is justifiedonly when the treatment costs are less than the benefits, either inreduced control expenditures or in reduced damages. (See below.)Proponents of forest health activities often assert that reduced fuelloadings can reduce fire control costs and damages. This assertion islogical, and is supported by some anecdotal evidence. However, thereappears to be very little research documentation of widespread firecontrol savings from fuel treatment, which is essential todemonstrate the merit of forest health activities for fire controlsavings.

 WILDFIRE EFFECTS

 Wildfires can damage lands and resources. Timber is burned,although some may be salvageable. Existing forage, for livestock andwildlife, is destroyed. The reduced vegetation can increase erosion;in severe situations, such as southern California, the result can bemudslides when the wet season returns. And burned areas are notpretty.

 The damages of wildfires on lands and resources are oftenoverstated, for two reasons. First, fires are patchy, leavingunburned areas within the fire perimeter. Thus, reports of acresburned, typically calculated from the perimeter, overstate the actualacres burned by 10 to 50 percent, depending on the local vegetative,weather, and other conditions.

 Damages are also usually overstated, because fires do notdestroy every living thing within the burned areas. Mature conifersoften survive even when their entire crowns are scorched; a fewspecies, notably lodgepole pine and jack pine, are serotinous --theircones will only open and spread their seeds when they have beenexposed to the heat of a wildfire. Grasses and other plants are oftenbenefitted by wildfire, because fire quickly decomposes organicmatter into its mineral components (a process that, in the arid West,may require years or decades without fire), and the flush ofnutrients accelerates plant growth for a few growing seasons. Fewanimals are killed by even the most severe wildfires; rather, manyanimals seek out burned sites for the newly available minerals andfor the flush of plant growth. And erosion is typically far worsealong the fire control lines than from the broad burned areas. Therecognition of these ecological benefits from fire was a major factorin the end of the 10-acre and 10:00 a.m. policies and theirreplacement with fuel management and prescribed fire (natural andotherwise).

 Nonetheless, the net damages from wildfires are generallygreater when fires burn more intensely. Thus, lower fuel loadings mayreduce the net damages caused by wildfires. Proponents argue thatforest health activities to reduce fuel loadings also reduce wildfiredamages. Again, this assertion is logical, and is supported by someanecdotal evidence, but there appears to be very little researchdocumenting widespread reduction in wildfire damages from fueltreatment. Such evidence is critical, however, to justify of foresthealth activities from lower fire damages.

 Finally, it should be noted that emergency rehabilitationoccurs on many of the large, severe wildfires. While emergencyactivities can prove beneficial, especially for erosion control, theymay inhibit the restoration of natural ecological processes. Inparticular, grasses are often seeded in severely burned areas.However, the quick-growing grasses typically used may not be nativeto the area, and some grasses suppress tree seedling establishmentand growth. Thus, while solving some environmental problems,emergency rehabilitation may cause other problems.

 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

 The Federal Government clearly has a responsibility for fireprotection on the Federal lands. The responsibility for protectinghomes and structures on private lands in and around the Federallands, however, is less clear. In general, the States are responsiblefor fire protection on non-federal lands, although cooperativeagreements may shift those responsibilities (especially when arealignment is efficient). It may be appropriate to maintain someseparation, because of structures on non-federal lands and thedifferences between structural fires and wildfires. (Structuralfirefighters use different techniques and face different hazards fromwildfire fighters, but basic Federal firefighting courses focus onfighting wildfires.)

 Furthermore, the Forest Service has a cooperative fireprotection program within its State and Private Forestry branch. Thisincludes: [1] financial and technical assistance to State andother governmental organizations; [2] equipment loans ofexcess Federal personal property; and [3] cooperative fireprevention to provide a nationwide fire prevention program throughpublic service advertising, education, partnerships, and otherefforts. FY1994 appropriations for cooperative fire protection were$17.1 million, but the budget request for FY1995 was only $3.7million, because President Clinton has proposed eliminating thefinancial assistance program (as was proposed several times byPresidents Reagan and Bush).(8)

 Another question is about the relative priorities inwildfire suppression. Assuming that the fires can be controlled,should Federal firefighting decisions include values at risk onadjoining or surrounded non-federal lands? If so, this is effectivelyFederal fire protection for certain private lands and structures. Ifnot, the Federal Government may be liable for damages to privatelands and structures from wildfires originating on the Federallands--essentially free Federal fire insurance. In either case, itraises the question of whether Federal responsibility warrantsFederal regulation--if the Federal government is responsible for fireprotection and/or insurance, then regulating building materials, siteclearing and planting, road construction and access, etc. might beappropriate to constrain Federal costs.

 Endnotes

 l. It is widely accepted that livestock grazing, timberharvesting, and fire suppression over the past century have led tounnatural conditions -- excessive biomass (too many trees and deadwoody material) and altered species mix -- in the pine forests of theWest; these conditions make the forests more susceptible to drought,insect and disease epidemics, and other forest-wide catastrophes(including large wildfires).

 2. For a brief history of Forest Service fire policy and ofwildfire economics, see: Julie K. Gorte and Ross W. Gorte.Application of Economic Techniques to Fire Management -- A StatusReview and Evaluation. Gen. Tech. Rept. INT-53. Ogden, UT: USDAForest Service, 1979. (Hereafter referred to as Gorte and Gorte,Economics of Fire Management.)

 3. See: Albert J. Simard, Donald A. Haines, Richard W.Blank, and John S. Frost. The Mach Lake Fire. Gen. Tech. Rept. NC-83.St. Paul, MN: USDA Forest Service, 1983.

 4. Sillce 1988, the Forest Service has been directed byCongress to share 25 percent of its salvage sale receipts with theStates. Since 100 percent of receipts are deposited in the SalvageFund, the receipt-sharing payments effectively require transfers fromother (non-salvage) timber sales. This reduces timber sale receiptsdeposited in the U.S. Treasury, and thus costs taxpayers.

 5. See: U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional ResearchService. Salvage Timber Sales and Forest Health. by Ross W. Gorte.CRS Report for Congress No. 95-364 ENR. Washington, DC: March 10,1995. 6 pp.

 6. The 10-acre policy was that all fires should becontrolled before they reached 10 acres in size; the 10:00 a.m.policy was that, for fires exceeding 10 acres, efforts should focuson control before the next burning period began (at 10:00 a.m.).

 7. See: Gorte and Gorte, Economics of Fire Management.

 8. The FY1996 budget request for Cooperative Lands-FireManagement is $17.6 million, slightly greater than the FY1994appropriations.

 This document was produced by the Congressional ResearchService. The Committee for the National Institute for the Environment(CNIE) has made these reports available to the public at large, butthe CRS is not affiliated with the CNIE or the National Library forthe Environment.